Pioneers of Youth Justice Reform: Achieving System Change Using Resolution, Reinvestment, and Realignment Strategies by Evans, Douglas N.
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Publications and Research John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
2012 
Pioneers of Youth Justice Reform: Achieving System Change 
Using Resolution, Reinvestment, and Realignment Strategies 
Douglas N. Evans 
CUNY John Jay College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/jj_pubs/399 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
Pioneers of Youth Justice Reform:
Achieving System Change Using Resolution, 
Reinvestment, and Realignment Strategies
Douglas N. Evans
Research and Evaluation Center 
July 2012
THE AUTHOR
Douglas N. Evans is a research analyst with the Research and Evaluation Center at John Jay 
College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York. He oversees research on youth justice 
initiatives, including the effects of policies and programs that divert resources from state 
institutions to community-based providers. He will earn the Ph.D. in criminal justice from Indiana 
University-Bloomington in 2012 and in September 2012, he will join the faculty at Mercy College 
of New York.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report was made possible by grants from the New York Community Trust and the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation to the John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the Research Foundation of the 
City University of New York. The author wishes to thank Benjamin Chambers and Jeffrey Butts 
for their comments and suggestions during the preparation of this document. Any opinions or 
conclusions presented in the report are those of the author alone.
RECOMMENDED CITATION
Evans, Douglas N. (2012). Pioneers of Youth Justice Reform: Achieving System Change Using 
Resolution, Reinvestment, and Realignment Strategies. New York, NY: Research and Evaluation 
Center, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary       1
Introduction       2
Resolution Models      4
 Massachusetts     4
 Utah      5  
 Missouri      6 
 Arkansas      8 
Reinvestment Models     10
 California (Subisdy)    12
 Pennsylvania    15  
 Wisconsin     18 
 Ohio     21 
 California (Sliding Scale)   24
 North Carolina    26 
 Deschutes County, Oregon   30
 Illinois     32
 Florida     35
 Texas     38
Realignment Models     41
 Wayne County, Mighigan   42
 California     47
 Texas     50
 New York     52
Conclusion      55
References     57
SUMMARY  |
In the past three decades, state and local governments implemented a 
variety of reform strategies to reduce the youth justice system’s reliance 
on confinement facilities and to serve as many youth as possible in their 
own homes or at least in their own communities when removal from the 
home is warranted. The various reform strategies may be conceptualized as 
relying on three distinct but interrelated mechanisms: resolution, reinvest-
ment, and realignment (Butts and Evans 2011). Resolution refers to the use 
of managerial authority and administrative directives to influence system 
change; reinvestment entails the use of financial incentives to encourage 
system change; and realignment employs organizational and structural modi-
fications to create new systems. This report describes the history and imple-
mentation of the most well-known reform initiatives that draw upon one or 
more of these mechanisms to achieve system change and it considers their 
impact on juvenile confinement at the state and local level.
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INTRODUCTION  |
In recent years, advocates for juvenile justice reform have welcomed a 
growing trend. State and local jurisdictions have begun to shift policies 
and practices toward treating and supervising young offenders in their own 
communities, instead of incarcerating them in distant correctional institutions 
operated by state government. The timing of these reforms is probably not 
coincidental. Rates of serious and violent youth crime have plummeted for 
more than 15 years (Butts 2012), and governmental budgets are strained 
due to lingering effects of the deep recession that began in 2008. 
Because juvenile crime rates have fallen nationwide even as fewer youth 
have been incarcerated and the youth population has grown, many 
policymakers searching for smart ways to keep the public safe while reducing 
costs have implemented reforms that limit the use of secure confinement 
for young offenders. What will happen if juvenile crime rates rise and the 
economy recovers? In such an environment, would policymakers reverse the 
recent reforms in spite of their effectiveness in saving money and protecting 
the public safety? The question facing the youth justice field today is, “will 
the reforms last?” 
In 2011, the John Jay College of Criminal Justice Research and Evaluation 
Center reviewed the history and impact of the leading reform efforts to limit 
the use of secure confinement for young offenders (Butts and Evans 2011). 
We found that reform initiatives rely, generally speaking, on three strategies 
for achieving system change: 
• resolution (direct managerial influence over system behavior); 
• reinvestment (financial incentives to change system behavior); and 
• realignment (organizational and structural modifications to alter 
   system behavior).  
Of course, the strategies are not mutually exclusive. A number of reform 
initiatives that rely largely on realignment began with financial reinvestment 
efforts, and all reforms could be described as begining with the resolution of 
managers and administrators. 
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The various initiatives borrow extensively from one another and later 
approaches are undoutedly inspired by previous efforts. California’s Probation 
Subsidy, for example, clearly provided the foundation for Pennsylvania’s 
Act 148, and both initiatives influenced the design of Wisconsin Youth Aids. 
Redeploy Illinois drew heavily from the lessons learned by policymakers 
implementing RECLAIM Ohio. Most of the initiatives continue to change and 
develop, but they are presented here in chronological order according to the 
time of their earliest appearance to illustrate the evolution of each reform 
strategy. 
State and local governments continue to implement youth justice reform 
initiatives that use one or more of the three strategies we described in our 
2011 report. This report provides more detailed information about these 
reform efforts. The goal of the report, much like our previous report, is to 
clarify the distinctions between the three models, and to show why, in our 
view, realignment is more likely than either resolution or reinvestment to 
result in system changes that are sustainable. 
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RESOLUTION MODELS  | 
Resolution, the most straightforward and common method method for 
reforming juvenile justice systems, is the use of managerial power to 
implement change. The prime example of this is the work of Jerome Miller, 
who revolutionized juvenile justice management when he shut down juvenile 
facilities across Massachusetts in the early 1970s. By removing out-of-home 
placement options, he made it impossible for judges to incarcerate 
young offenders. When evaluations indicated that Miller’s reforms did not 
compromise public safety, other states began to follow his lead.
MASSACHUSETTS
Jerome Miller became Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of 
Youth Services (DYS) in 1969. He found that the longer a juvenile stayed 
in a DYS facility, the worse he or she performed following release (Miller 
1991), regardless of risk-level. Miller attributed this to the department’s 
institutional culture, and he attempted to reform the department by 
establishing institutional therapeutic communities to encourage rehabilitation 
of youth. To support the shift, Miller implemented a number of changes, 
including staff training in humane treatment of youth, educational programs, 
clinical evaluations, and counseling. Staff members, unable to modify their 
perception of their role to adhere to Miller’s vision of humane juvenile 
treatment, resisted his reforms. Miller subsequently concluded that it was 
impossible to restructure the institutional culture, and in 1972 he shut down 
the department and closed every state juvenile facility. 
Although other state officials were 
concerned about handling violent 
juvenile offenders, Miller believed 
that institutions existed to be 
occupied, and he recognized that 
the number of available beds was 
a key determinant in the size of an 
institutional population. After closing 
the DYS facilities, Miller limited 
the number of beds in smaller, 
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localized treatment-based youth facilities to 35, and in doing so, reduced 
the number of juvenile offenders labeled as “dangerous” (Miller 1991). By 
limiting commitments to only the highest-risk youth, Miller’s reforms enabled 
low-level offenders, the majority of adjudicated youth, to remain in their 
communities. 
Miller had little support for closing DYS facilities from other policymakers. 
Even after facilities had been shut down, the state continued to pay staff to 
fill empty institutions, which made it difficult for Miller to obtain the funding 
required to relocate juveniles into community-based placements. Although 
Miller secured federal grant money and found loopholes that enabled him 
to reallocate some money earmarked for institutions, the state was slow to 
contribute its share to community-based programs, because they were not a 
budget priority. This deprived smaller programs of funds needed to care for 
the juveniles who had already been accepted (Miller 1991).  
In the long run, however, the Massachusetts reforms were effective, though 
radical. Juvenile crime in Massachusetts declined in subsequent years 
and fewer juveniles released from DYS programs ended up in adult court 
(Schwartz 1989). For this reason, the reforms became a model for other 
states seeking to save on the high costs of juvenile incarceration, provide 
effective youth rehabilitation, and improve their juvenile justice systems. 
UTAH
In the mid 1970s, the state of Utah nearly lost control of its Youth 
Development Center (YDC), a large (350 bed) residential facility for juvenile 
delinquents, when it was sued for inhumane treatment of its juvenile wards. 
05 EvEn aftEr facilitiEs had bEEn shut down, thE statE 
continuEd to pay staff to fill Empty institutions, 
which madE it difficult for millEr to obtain 
thE funding rEquirEd to rElocatE juvEnilEs into 
community-basEd placEmEnts.
Rather than hand the YDC over to a federal court, incoming Governor Scott 
Matheson appointed a task force to review the state juvenile justice system 
and offer recommendations for change. Influenced by the Massachusetts 
reforms, the task force proposed shutting down the Youth Development 
Center. 
Governor Matheson closed the YDC and transformed the Utah juvenile justice 
system. Youth rehabilitation became the primary objective, and reforms 
acknowledged that the conditions inside state facilities conflicted with 
successful rehabilitation. In place of the YDC, Utah funded community-based 
programs and built three small, high-security facilities with space limited to 
60 beds (Krisberg 2005). Money that had been previously allocated to the 
YDC was reallocated to community-based programs. The reforms saved Utah 
millions of dollars in a short amount of time and improved the outcomes of 
juvenile offenders (Schwartz 1989). Between 1979 and 1982, the number of 
juveniles in Utah residential facilities decreased 57 percent. By 1982, Utah 
had one of the lowest youth residential facility admission rates in the country 
(Krisberg et al. 1986). 
MISSOURI
Forty years ago, juvenile facilities in Missouri were notorious for overcrowding 
and deplorable conditions. In response to recurring criticism, Missouri officials 
launched an ambitious reform of the state’s juvenile justice system. By 
1983, state officials had shut down both the boys’ and girls’ youth training 
schools (Missouri Division of Youth Services 2010b). Youth housed in these 
large state institutions were often confined hundreds of miles from their 
homes and families; once the training schools were shut down, youth were 
shifted to smaller, local facilities dispersed across the state. This transition 
proved to be cost-effective (Balck 2010). There are currently 25 community 
care facilities, group homes, and moderate security facilities for juveniles 
throughout Missouri, each containing between 10 and 50 beds. Seven 
secure-care facilities remain to house more serious offenders, but these 
facilities are smaller and more rehabilitative than the former training schools 
-- each houses no more than 36 juveniles at a time. There are no longer any 
prison-like facilities for juveniles in Missouri. 
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Contemporary residential facilities are designed to be nothing like the prisons 
the old training schools resembled. Juveniles are never locked up, and there 
are no cell bars. Youth have freedom to move about their dorm rooms, wear 
any clothing they choose, and hang up artwork on their room walls. During 
their stay, juveniles spend a majority of their time in treatment groups that 
offer a structured and therapeutic environment, as opposed to isolation in a 
cell. They receive educational services, job training, and communication and 
problem-solving skills to help them succeed after their release. Their families 
are encouraged to visit and participate in the rehabilitation process. Aftercare 
planning to help youth prepare to reenter their communities begins prior 
to their release and youth are closely monitored during the first few weeks 
following release (Mendel 2010).  
The Missouri approach to rehabilitation in residential facilities has shown 
promise. For every youth steered away from a life of crime, Missouri saves at 
least $3 million in victim costs and criminal justice expenses, in addition to 
any taxes the youth might pay during his or her lifetime (Mendel 2010). Of 
the youth released from custody in 2010, 84 percent remained law-abiding 
one year after their release (Missouri Division of Youth Services 2010a). 
Fewer than eight percent of juveniles released from the Missouri system 
return, which is approximately the same percentage that end up in adult 
prison (Edelman 2010). These results have gained national recognition; the 
approach is now known as the “Missouri Model.” Several states have begun to 
replicate or are considering replicating the Missouri Model.
07 thE missouri approach to rEhabilitation in 
rEsidEntial facilitiEs has shown promisE. for EvEry 
youth stEErEd away from a lifE of crimE, missouri 
savEs at lEast $3 million in victim costs and 
criminal justicE ExpEnsEs, in addition to any taxEs 
thE youth might pay during his or hEr lifEtimE.
ARKANSAS
Arkansas was in need of less costly and more effective methods for handling 
juvenile delinquents. By fiscal year 2008, the price of juvenile incarceration 
had exhausted the state budget: it cost the state $150 per day to confine 
one juvenile in a state correctional facility and over $500 per day to send 
a youth to a mental health facility (Arthur and Roche 2008). When judges 
placed juvenile delinquents in a community-based program, however, it 
cost only $86 each day (Public Welfare Foundation 2010). But judges often 
confined youth because many local jurisdictions had limited community-
based alternatives (Arthur and Roche 2008). 
Because juvenile crime had dropped 41 percent between 1998 and 2007 
(Kelly 2008), policymakers had a window of opportunity in which to make 
change. When crime is high, the public tends to demand punishment, but 
when crime is low, governments can focus on evidence-based reform. 
The Arkansas General Assembly passed Senate Resolution 31 in 2007. 
Resolution 31 provided the initial impetus for reform by requesting an 
analysis of the current juvenile justice system and an exploration of 
methods for improvement (State of Arkansas 86th General Assembly 2007). 
Research consultants teamed with the National Center for Youth Law to 
offer a comprehensive overview of the juvenile justice system and several 
recommendations for reforms (Arthur and Roche 2008). 
As a result, in 2009 the Arkansas Department of Youth Services (DYS) 
introduced a five-year plan to reform the state’s juvenile justice system. 
The reforms seek to alter multiple facets of the juvenile justice system and 
shift the emphasis from incarceration to community-based treatment. Plan 
goals include reductions in youth confinement, investment in the expansion 
of community-based options, and maximizing current funding while seeking 
new sources of funds for juvenile services (Arkansas Department of Human 
Services 2009).  
Arkansas is now more than halfway through implementation of its 
five-year plan for juvenile justice reform and shows early indicators of 
change. The state has launched pilot programs and continues to add to its 
community-based programming options. One of its goals was to reduce the 
population of juveniles in state custody by 50 percent as of 2014 (Arkansas 
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Department of Human Services 2009), and the juvenile incarceration rate has 
decreased each year over the last three years, in part because fewer youth 
are being arrested. In 2009, there were 636 juveniles in Department of Youth 
Services (DYS) facilities. The DYS population declined to 531 juveniles in 
2010 and 481 juveniles in 2011. Thirteen counties did not place any juveniles 
in a secure facility in 2007 (Arthur and Roche 2008).  In addition, the number 
of re-incarcerated juveniles decreased 20 percentage points between the 
fiscal year 2010 and 2011 (Arkansas Department of Human Services 2011).
Despite the drop in overall commitments to state facilities, the rate of 
non-violent juvenile commitments has increased, while the rate of violent and 
serious juvenile commitments has decreased. In Fiscal Year 1997, 30 percent 
of commitments were misdemeanor offenders, but in FY 2008, 90 percent of 
juveniles in DYS facilities were non-violent offenders. During this time, the 
rate of serious offending youth commitments decreased from 26 percent to 
15 percent (Arthur and Roche 2008). The result is that the DYS population 
now consists disproportionately of low-level juvenile offenders. Nevertheless, 
Arkansas continues to apply tactics used by other states to shift reliance from 
secure placement to community-based treatment. 
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REINVESTMENT MODELS  | 
The most significant issues facing juvenile justice systems are cost and 
recidivism. While the cost of community-based supervision and treatment is 
significant, incarceration is far more expensive and offers less in the way of 
rehabilitation. It costs state governments approximately $100,000 per year 
to incarcerate one juvenile, and in California, the annual cost has reached 
$225,000 (Ferriss 2010). Given that more than 80,000 juveniles served 
time in state institutions in the U.S. in 2008, it’s no surprise that juvenile 
incarceration creates significant expenditures nationwide (Sickmund 2010). 
According to a recent estimate, the U.S. spends about $5.7 billion a year on 
juvenile incarceration (Petteruti, Walsh and Velazquez 2009).
While incarceration may be necessary for a small number of high-risk 
juveniles, it appears to be harmful for most youth. Incarcerated juveniles, 
especially those low in risk, tend to recidivate at higher rates than youth 
treated in their homes or communities. In spite of this, many youth courts 
place juveniles in state facilities for committing non-violent, low-level 
offenses or violating probation. Furthermore, community-based alternatives 
are not available in many states, leaving courts with no dispositional option 
besides incarceration.
Since state governments are typically responsible for a majority of the costs 
of juvenile incarceration, county courts are often able to send juveniles to 
state institutions without financial penalty. To reduce juvenile incarceration 
and conserve financial resources, therefore, a number of jurisdictions have 
adopted reinvestment strategies. Reinvestment is the creation of financial 
incentives that encourage state and county governments to reduce spending 
on incarceration and instead fund 
community-based programming. 
The objective is to conserve 
financial resources and improve the 
rehabilitative impact of the juvenile 
justice system. 
States that adopt reinvestment 
strategies offer financial incentives 
to counties for reducing their 
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use of incarceration. The incentives enable counties to fund and develop 
community-based treatment programs for juveniles and keep them out of 
state facilities (Balck 2010). Under a reinvestment model, the state also 
holds counties accountable for at least a portion of the costs of juvenile 
confinement. At least three states (California, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) charge 
counties for institutional placement on a sliding scale, meaning that the cost 
of incarceration increases as the severity of the juvenile’s offense decreases. 
State governments that minimize correctional costs can invest the savings 
in community-based treatment programs, victim services, housing services, 
education, employment, and risk prevention strategies. 
The Council of State Governments Justice Center works with jurisdictions 
across the U.S. to implement reinvestment approaches, and has created a 
strategy for effectively putting reinvestment into operation. Stakeholders 
begin by collecting data on community variables: crime hot spots, factors 
that affect crime, arrest, conviction, and recidivism rates, information 
on the institutional and community supervision populations, and the 
neighborhoods most in need of resources (Council of State Governments 
Justice Center 2010). After compiling this data, the next step is to establish 
cost-reducing policies in each phase of the system; for example, prioritizing 
arrests, reducing bail restrictions, efficient case processing, and community 
sentencing when the offender’s risk level is appropriate. It is important 
for stakeholders to conduct ongoing evaluations, document cost-benefit 
analyses, measure the savings associated with the modifications, and ensure 
that key players are accountable (Council of State Governments Justice 
Center 2010; La Vigne et al. 2010). Adopting a reinvestment approach, 
then, is a lengthy and system-wide process, but it has helped many states to 
reduce unnecessary expenditures, conserve resources, and reallocate savings 
toward programs that improve rehabilitation and promote public safety.
11 thE council of statE govErnmEnts justicE 
cEntEr works with jurisdictions across thE 
u.s. to implEmEnt rEinvEstmEnt approachEs, and 
has crEatEd a stratEgy for EffEctivEly putting 
rEinvEstmEnt into opEration.
It is difficult to isolate the impact of reinvestment strategies on youth 
confinement rates. Every community benefits from the nationwide reduction 
in crime rates, and when crime rates are low, it is easier for policymakers 
to promote strategies that reduce the use of confinement. When crime 
rates rise or politics shift, will these reinvestment strategies be scaled back 
or abandoned? Deschutes County, Oregon, for example, discontinued its 
reinvestment program when its six-year pilot expired. It remains to be seen 
how the jurisdictions described below will respond if and when juvenile crime 
increases. Will policymakers continue their reinvestment strategies or will 
they implement policies that support expansions in youth confinement? 
CALIFORNIA (SUBSIDY)
Modern juvenile justice reinvestment can be traced back to the California 
Youth Authority’s enactment of the Probation Subsidy Act in 1965. The goal 
of the legislation was to keep adjudicated juveniles out of state institutions 
and close to home on probation.
The stage was set for the Subsidy Act when California offered payments to 
counties to subsidize the costs of probation in 1945, to encourage statewide 
use of probation and keep low-level offenders out of state institutions. 
Probation became a standard sentence for first time and non-serious 
offenders once counties had the resources and personnel to fund and 
supervise caseloads. 
12 it is difficult to isolatE thE impact of rEinvEstmEnt 
stratEgiEs on youth confinEmEnt ratEs. EvEry 
community bEnEfits from thE nationwidE rEduction 
in crimE ratEs, and whEn crimE ratEs arE low, it 
is EasiEr for policymakErs to promotE stratEgiEs 
that rEducE thE usE of confinEmEnt. whEn crimE 
ratEs risE or politics shift, will thEsE rEinvEstmEnt 
stratEgiEs bE scalEd back or abandonEd?
Over time, however, probationers became difficult to manage as caseloads 
increased and staff sizes remained constant. Probation officers were forced 
to handle caseloads as high as three times the recommended standard of 
the day, raising concerns that probation services were becoming ineffective. 
Meaningful supervision became unrealistic because a majority of probation 
officer work was spent on routine check-ins and paperwork. To cope with 
the burden, probation departments referred more offenders to state 
institutions. The belief was that inmates could receive better treatment while 
incarcerated. The result was a large growth in the California correctional 
population, where recidivism was close to 50 percent (Smith 1972). From 
1952 to 1968, the number of juvenile beds in state institutions increased 
from 2,500 to 6,421 (Breed 1974). The growth of the correctional system 
created a need for new facilities. As more offenders were institutionalized, 
taxpayer spending on state corrections was among the highest in the nation. 
To improve the supervision of probationers and reduce the reliance on costly 
institutional placements, the California legislature passed the Probation 
Subsidy Act of 1965. The Act offered financial incentives to counties willing 
to use probation instead of state corrections. State officials believed that 
probation was the most effective and cost-efficient way to manage at least 
one-fourth of the offenders being sent to state institutions. If probation 
departments were rewarded for achieving certain objectives, the hope was 
that probation would improve. 
Under the Probation Subsidy Act, county probation departments received 
between $2,080 and $4,000 for each offender not committed to a state 
institution. The $4,000 maximum was set because it represented the 
minimum cost for placing one juvenile in a state institution (Smith 1972). 
Probation subsidy established a cost-effective system that required county 
accountability for handling offenders. The financial incentives discouraged 
incarceration, which enabled the state to save on the high cost of 
out-of-home placements. Probation departments used the savings to hire 
more officers, supervisors, support staff, and aid positions. 
Between 1965 and 1969, the percentage of convicted offenders placed in 
state prisons and juvenile institutions decreased from 23 percent to almost 
10 percent (Smith 1972). From 1970 to 1971, 44 participating counties were 
able to reduce their combined institutional commitments by 4,495, and as 
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a result were rewarded with more than $18 million from the state (Breed 
1974). The program ultimately resulted in the diversion of more than 45,000 
offenders (Smith 1972). The reduction in the correctional population allowed 
California to close at least one correctional facility and halt the construction 
of future facilities, which saved millions. 
Several policies and reforms emerged following the success of probation 
subsidy. Treatment professionals began categorizing juveniles based on 
their needs. Probation departments adopted therapeutic community models 
and work release for eligible juveniles. The Increased Parole Effectiveness 
Program (IPEP) was launched in 1971 to improve state parole. The IPEP 
established empirical measures to assess parole officer performance, 
increased the number of parole officers by 100 to ameliorate caseloads, and 
connected parolees to treatment resources in the community. Within one 
year, the IPEP reduced the number of parole revocations (Breed 1974). 
Although the California Probation Subsidy Act was financially successful, 
probation eventually became more and more expensive as a result of high 
numbers of offenders entering the system, many of whom were arrested 
for drug offenses. Because the state never raised its subsidy, however — it 
remained capped at $4,000 — county enthusiasm for the program waned. 
Moreover, the treatment programs that were to accompany probation never 
materialized at the county level, so probation amounted to little more than a 
system of supervision. 
The California reforms eventually caught on in other states. In 1969, 
Washington State passed the Juvenile Probation Subsidy Act, modeled after 
California’s. Prior to its passage, Washington had been unable to provide 
juvenile delinquents with proper treatment, so county courts frequently 
committed juveniles to state facilities. The new act halted this trend and 
offered counties financial incentives to develop youth treatment programs. 
This drastically reduced the juvenile institutional population (Department of 
Social and Health Services 1975). The success of Washington’s probation 
subsidy confirmed that financial rearrangements between states and counties 
could reduce state expenditures and generate funds for counties to create 
community-based options for adjudicated juveniles.
14
California discontinued the Probation Subsidy Act in 1978. In its 13-year 
existence, Probation Subsidy led to reductions in incarceration and financial 
savings for counties. Most importantly for other states, it provided the 
blueprint for a financial structure that discouraged incarceration. 
PENNSYLVANIA 
In the 1960s, Pennsylvania juvenile justice was disorganized and had no 
central method for handling juvenile offenders. Because the state paid for 
incarceration, it was less costly for counties to place juvenile offenders in 
a state facility than to supervise them locally (Tyler, Ziedenberg and Lotke 
2006). There was no incentive for counties to provide in-home supervision 
or treatment for adjudicated juveniles, and county judges had discretion to 
send juvenile delinquents to adult prison. As a result, many juveniles were 
sentenced to the State Correctional Institution, an adult facility in Camp 
Hill, Pennsylvania, where they could be held until age 21. A 1975 court 
ruling ultimately outlawed the incarceration of juveniles at Camp Hill (Youth 
Advocate Programs 2011). The ruling was a spark for juvenile justice reform.
In 1976, the Pennsylvania legislature passed Act 148 to address two goals: 
reduce the number of incarcerated juveniles and develop programs to 
supervise and treat juveniles in their communities. Act 148 was inspired by 
the 1950s deinstitutionalization movement, in which officials moved persons 
in 1976, thE pEnnsylvania lEgislaturE passEd 
act 148 to addrEss two goals: rEducE thE 
numbEr of incarcEratEd juvEnilEs and dEvElop 
programs to supErvisE and trEat juvEnilEs in 
thEir communitiEs. act 148 was inspirEd by 
thE 1950s dEinstitutionalization movEmEnt, 
in which officials movEd pErsons with mEntal 
illnEss out of statE facilitiEs and opEnEd 
community trEatmEnt facilitiEs. 
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with mental illness out of state facilities and opened community treatment 
facilities. In its turn, Act 148 made it a priority to keep juveniles in-home 
and offer treatments such as after-school programs, outpatient counseling, 
and case management services through private providers. If a judge decided 
that a juvenile could not remain at home, the next preferred placement was 
a group home or a non-secure treatment facility in the community. This 
allowed juveniles to attend school and hold a job in a work release program 
(Aryna et al. 2005). The last resort was to send juvenile offenders to a 
secure facility.
To achieve its goals, Act 148 altered the financial arrangement between 
the state and counties, and offered counties fiscal incentives to develop 
alternatives to incarceration for at-risk youth. There were no requirements 
for specific programs, which allowed counties freedom to create alternatives, 
as long as they adhered to the missions of public safety and youth 
rehabilitation outside of confinement (Aryna et al. 2005).  
To cover the costs of services, Act 148 integrated four funding sources in a 
formula still used today. Funding sources are tapped in a specified order to 
cover the costs of home-based, community-based, or institutional services. 
Private funds from juvenile clients, their families, and government benefits 
(e.g., Social Security) must be used first. Federal funds are used next, such 
as Title IV-E Placement Maintenance, which covers the costs of out-of-home 
placements resulting from delinquency or dependency, or TANF (Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families), which subsidizes support services for 
families in need. When federal funds are drained, state funds are available to 
reimburse counties for juvenile justice and child welfare expenditures. The 
state reimburses counties for 80 percent of the cost of community-based 
services, but only 40 percent for the costs of confinement in a state facility 
or juvenile detention center (Petteruti, Walsh and Velasquez 2009). The last 
resort for any county that exhausts private, federal, and state funds is to 
utilize its own financial resources (Griffin 2003). 
Act 148 showed success within a few years of its enactment. Between 
1981 and 1984, there was a 20 percent increase in juveniles entering 
community-based programs and a 52 percent increase in juveniles entering 
day treatment (Aryna et al. 2005). During the same three-year span, state 
subsidies for county programming increased from $65 million to $114 million. 
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State reimbursements gave counties the flexibility to develop risk-focused 
programming, counseling assistance, and monitoring services. The funds also 
enabled juvenile court judges to retain low-level juvenile offenders in their 
communities so that they could receive treatment while attending school 
and work. Until the mid-1970s, most counties did not have the resources 
available to develop community-based services, but the incentives in Act 148 
established the necessary funding.
Most significantly, juvenile commitments to state facilities dropped 24 
percent between 1981 and 1984, a trend that continued into the 21st 
century. By 2003, only five percent of adjudicated juveniles taken out of their 
homes were confined in a secure facility (Arnya et al. 2005). 
The financial arrangement of Act 148 concerned both state and county 
governments. The state worried that counties had unrestricted use of 
funds, while counties did not want to be locked into a fixed budget and 
risk depleting state funds prior to the end of the fiscal year. In the 1990s, 
the state legislature amended Act 148 to create a system of needs-based 
planning and budgeting, to allow for a more flexible use of state funds 
(Arnya et al. 2005). 
Under the needs-based 
system, counties submit 
a budget proposal for 
planned services to the 
Department of Public 
Welfare (DPW). The 
DPW then submits an 
aggregate proposal to 
the legislature, which 
allocates funds as 
needed. Needs-based 
planning and budgeting 
gives counties flexibility 
to request funding for 
programs as needed, and 
it provides the state with 
budgetary oversight. 
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Act 148 transformed juvenile justice in Pennsylvania. Secure institutions 
are rarely used, and counties have more financial resources to strengthen 
probation departments and develop treatment programs, supervision 
services, and in-home counseling. Private service providers manage many of 
the community-based services. The youth programs in Allegheny County are 
so effective that neighboring states utilize them from time to time, although 
Pennsylvania does not bear these costs (Arnya et al. 2005). Act 148 provided 
a framework for other states seeking to reduce costs and rehabilitate 
juveniles. 
WISCONSIN
Prior to the passage of the Community Youth and Family Aids Program 
(Youth Aids) in 1979, the state of Wisconsin was accountable for the 
costs of youth incarceration, while counties were responsible for funding 
local supervision and rehabilitation programs. Because most counties 
lacked the financial resources to create and sustain juvenile rehabilitation 
programs, incarceration became a primary option. Recognizing that funding 
arrangements created financial incentives for counties to place juveniles in 
secure institutions, Wisconsin emulated Pennsylvania and passed the Youth 
Aids legislation to address the problem. 
The Department of Juvenile Corrections launched Youth Aids on January 
1, 1981. Youth Aids held counties financially accountable for juvenile 
incarceration and dispersed funding from the Department of Health and 
Human Services to counties for the development of community-based 
alternatives to incarceration (Balck 2010). Ten counties participated in the 
Youth Aids pilot program; one year later, 72 counties shared $25.5 million in 
state Youth Aids funds (Carmichael 2011). The revised funding arrangement 
shifted Wisconsin toward a treatment-focused juvenile justice system. 
Youth Aids had several initial objectives. The primary goal was to decentralize 
the financial management of juvenile justice from the state and enable 
counties to manage autonomous juvenile justice systems. Another objective 
was to divert young people from out-of-home placements by enabling local 
jurisdictions to supervise and treat juveniles through in-home or community-
based programs. For juveniles who could not be treated in their homes, 
Youth Aids sought to reduce the length of time they spend in out-of-home 
placements (Stuiber et al. 1999). 
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Still in operation today, Youth Aids uses a formula to disburse state funds 
to counties. The formula is based on three statistics: the county’s juvenile 
population, number of juvenile arrests, and number of juveniles from each 
county placed in a state facility (Tyler, Ziedenberg and Lotke 2006). Initially, 
$78 million was set as the total base allocation for Youth Aids (Carmichael 
2007); extra funds were allocated for specific purposes: alcohol and drug 
abuse treatment ($1.3 million), corrective sanctions ($2.1 million), arrest 
supplement ($200,000) and emergency funds for small counties ($250,000). 
To ensure that smaller counties received adequate funding, a 1982 provision 
mandated that counties receive no less than $19,000 in Youth Aids funds. 
Between 1999 and 2007, the legislature added $17.6 million in additional 
funds, bringing the total amount of state Youth Aids funds to more than 
$100 million by 2008 (Carmichael 2011). The funds — a mix of federal and 
state money — have enabled Wisconsin to continue its Youth Aids program 
and offer an array of community-based services to adjudicated juveniles. 
In addition, the Wisconsin Division of Juvenile Corrections oversees three 
juvenile institutions, two of which are male-only, and one female-only.
Counties must follow guidelines when spending Youth Aids funds. According 
to state statute, the cost of out-of-home placements must be paid first, and 
any remaining funds can then be used to finance community-based programs 
(Stuiber et al. 1999). Since juvenile court judges have the discretion to 
use in-home or out-of-home placements based on a youth’s offense and 
background, the guidelines are meant to encourage them to consider 
community-based options before institutional placement. 
There are crucial differences in supervision and available treatment options 
associated with in-home and out-of-home dispositions. In-home supervision 
ranges from minimal (weekly check-ins) to strict (intensive supervision, 
electronic monitoring). There may be additional requirements to participate 
in any of the following: individual or family counseling, after-school 
activities, work supervision, vocational training, restitution payments to 
victims, community service, or victim-offender mediation. Counties provide 
community-based juvenile services themselves, or contract with private 
organizations to provide such services (Carmichael 2011). Out-of-home 
dispositions are reserved for serious or repeat juvenile offenders or 
delinquents who cannot live at home. These placements range from foster or 
group homes to secure facilities (Stuiber et al. 1999). 
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Youth Aids established financial accountability to ensure that counties took 
responsibility for adjudicated juveniles. The state bills counties for the entire 
cost of confining a juvenile in a state institution, though there are certain 
exceptions. If a court determines that a juvenile is a serious offender or if a 
juvenile is waived to adult court and subsequently serves time in a juvenile 
correctional facility, the state pays the costs of placement (Carmichael 2007). 
It appears that Youth Aids may have had a positive effect on juvenile crime 
and arrests. State statistics indicate that between 1997 and 2006, juvenile 
drug offenses declined 52 percent, juvenile property crime declined 46 
percent, and person crimes involving juvenile perpetrators decreased 22 
percent. From 1996 to 2005, the number of juvenile arrests dropped by 25 
percent, even though the juvenile population increased slightly during the 
same period (Carmichael 2007). 
Although crime and incarceration rates have little effect on one another, 
Wisconsin’s juvenile institutional population decreased as well. From 1997 
to 2006, the number of incarcerated juveniles in Wisconsin decreased 33 
percent (Sickmund, Sladky and Kang 2008). In Milwaukee County, by far the 
most populated county in the state, juvenile commitments declined nearly 75 
percent between 1995 and 2005 (Tyler, Ziedenberg and Lotke 2006). 
Youth Aids has experienced some problems during its 30-year existence, 
particularly in terms of funding. For example, in its second year of operation, 
counties spent $4.7 million more than what was available through Youth Aids. 
This accounted for more than eight percent of the total cost of community-
based youth services, for which counties were responsible. Between 1992 
and 1997, expenditures for in-home services increased 54 percent, from $34 
million to $52 million, although the number of juveniles receiving in-home 
services increased only 1 percent (Stuiber et al. 1999). During that five-year 
span, county expenditures increased while state expenditures decreased 
each year, suggesting an overall decline in Youth Aids support. In 1992, 
Youth Aids funds covered almost 65 percent of the cost of community-based 
services. By 1997, Youth Aids covered only 45 percent of the $181 million 
cost to counties. As a result, only 18 counties had enough funds to pay for 
out-of-home placements, whereas 42 had been able to pay these costs in 
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1992. For their share, counties used property tax revenue and grant money 
to supplement Youth Aids funds (Stuiber et al. 1999). Despite freezes in 
county allocations and rising costs of services, Youth Aids continues to 
provide financial aid for counties to supervise and treat juveniles in their 
homes and communities. 
OHIO
In the 1970s and 80s, political shifts led to the adoption of punitive policies 
in the American criminal and juvenile justice systems. While some states 
continued to use indeterminate sentences for youth offenders to account 
for the variable length of time each juvenile needed to rehabilitate, Ohio 
implemented a determinate sentencing model for juveniles in 1987 (Feld 
1990). Each year thereafter, the population of incarcerated juveniles 
increased.
Under the sentencing guidelines, juvenile court judges had few options when 
rendering dispositions for adjudicated youth. Their discretion was limited to 
sending a juvenile delinquent home or incarcerating him or her in a secure 
facility; intermediate options were not available, as Ohio counties did not 
have community-based supervision or treatment options for juveniles. And 
while judges could send violent juvenile offenders to a Department of Youth 
Services (DYS) facility, they had little authority over the length of time that 
juveniles remained in DYS custody. The law required felony-convicted youth 
sent to a DYS facility to stay for at least one year (Moon, Applegate and 
Latessa 1997). There was also a financial incentive for county juvenile judges 
to render out-of-home placements, because the state paid the cost of DYS 
confinement, and counties had no financial responsibility for incarcerating 
juveniles (Tyler, Ziedenberg and Lotke 2006).  
As a result, by 1991, four of the 20 most overcrowded juvenile facilities 
in the nation were in Ohio (Austin et al. 1995), and a DYS administrator 
has said that by 1992, the number of juveniles in DYS facilities was nearly 
double its intended capacity of 1,400 (National Criminal Justice Association). 
To address the overcrowding and reports of violence involving DYS staff 
and residents, the state launched Reasoned and Equitable Community and 
Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of Minors (RECLAIM Ohio) in 1994. 
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The objectives of RECLAIM were to expand judicial dispositions for juvenile 
offenders, reduce the DYS population, alter the financial arrangement 
between the state and the counties, and provide counties with resources to 
develop community-based programs for at-risk and adjudicated juveniles 
(National Criminal Justice Association; Lowenkamp and Latessa 2005a). 
RECLAIM allocates state funds to counties to cover the costs of DYS 
placement and community-based services. The exact allocation is based 
on the county’s average number of juvenile felony adjudications over a 
four-year span (Tyler, Ziedenberg and Lotke 2006). If counties reduce 
juvenile DYS placements in a given year, they stand to earn more money 
the following year. Furthermore, counties must pay 75 percent of the cost 
of DYS confinement but only have to pay 50 percent of the cost of placing 
youth in a community corrections facility (Tyler, Ziedenberg and Lotke 2006). 
Community corrections facilities (CCFs) are distinct from DYS facilities in 
that they are locally operated rather than state-controlled. They are usually 
more cost-effective and offer more treatment options than DYS facilities 
(Lowenkamp et al. 2010). 
There are some exceptions to county responsibility for DYS placement. For 
juveniles who commit murder or rape, counties are not responsible for the 
cost of DYS placement, due to the exceptional level of threat that these 
juveniles may pose to the community. Counties also are not responsible for 
the cost of placement if a youth commits a serious or violent offense inside a 
DYS facility (Moon, Applegate and Latessa 1997). 
RECLAIM was piloted in nine counties in 1994. The pilot counties 
demonstrated success by developing community-based programs that 
enabled them to reduce DYS commitments. An assessment showed that 
the pilot counties reduced DYS commitments by 42 percent, while DYS 
commitments from non-pilot counties increased 23 percent during the same 
time (Moon, Applegate and Latessa 1997). A closer inspection of the data 
revealed no changes in the number of serious felony offenders diverted 
from DYS facilities before and after implementation of pilot RECLAIM. There 
was, however, a significant drop in low-level felony commitments from pilot 
counties (Lowenkamp and Latessa 2005a). 
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In 1995, RECLAIM Ohio was launched statewide to include the remaining 
79 counties, and served 6,945 juveniles in 1995 (Latessa et al. 1998), with 
$71 million in allocations to counties. By August of 2011, state allocations to 
counties had increased to $252 million (Ohio Department of Youth Services 
2011). RECLAIM funds helped counties develop community-based programs 
such as intensive probation, substance abuse treatment, monitoring, 
restitution and community service, educational services, and family 
preservation programs (Latessa et al. 1998). A majority of county courts 
supported these programs, which helped to extend and promote their use. 
After RECLAIM went statewide, researchers from the University of Cincinnati 
conducted an assessment of the program. They found that 73 percent of 
juveniles successfully completed the RECLAIM program, while 21 percent 
were deemed unsuccessful, meaning that they were arrested or adjudicated 
for a new offense, cited for negative behavior, violated parole, or did 
not attend the program. Compared to the pilot study, in the first year of 
statewide implementation, successful RECLAIM completions increased 10 
percent and unsuccessful terminations decreased seven percent (Latessa et 
al. 1998). A later evaluation comparing DYS and community-based RECLAIM 
placements indicated that DYS placement could detrimentally affect low-risk 
youth, and that RECLAIM placement had negligible effects on high-risk youth, 
who might be more effectively served in DYS custody (Lowenkamp and 
Latessa 2005a). 
Although the nationwide crime drop certainly had an impact, RECLAIM Ohio 
has helped reduce the DYS population and improve DYS functioning. Between 
2000 and 2009, the number of juveniles adjudicated for a felony offense 
declined 32 percent. With one exception, the DYS population decreased every 
year during that span. In 2009, there were 130,000 juvenile admissions to 
more than 650 RECLAIM programs. DYS facilities held 1,228 juveniles in 
2009 (compared to 2,453 in 2001), and community corrections facilities held 
541 juveniles (Ohio Department of Youth Services). As of March 2011, the 
population in DYS facilities had dropped to 736. Four DYS facilities had been 
shut down and 300 DYS staff positions had been cut since 2009 (Johnson 
2011). The decline in the DYS population indicates that RECLAIM Ohio has 
achieved its central objective. 
It also appears to have achieved its other objectives, as well. Not only do 
judges have alternative sentencing options to incarceration because counties 
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have received resources to develop community-based programming, but Ohio 
has realized significant savings from RECLAIM. It costs the state $123,370 
to keep one juvenile in a DYS facility for a year. Placing a juvenile in a 
community-based RECLAIM program costs $8,539 annually (Lowenkamp and 
Latessa 2005b). For every dollar spent on RECLAIM, the state saves between 
$11 and $45 on the cost of juvenile confinement, depending on the juvenile’s 
risk level (Lowenkamp and Latessa 2005b). 
In addition to the impact of RECLAIM on the DYS population and the state 
budget, the program has renewed the rehabilitative philosophy of juvenile 
justice in Ohio. County judges now have various options, so that many 
low-risk juveniles are supervised and treated in their communities. This 
allows families to participate in the treatment process and enables their 
access to educational and vocational resources in the community.
RECLAIM contains elements that appease policymakers of various political 
perspectives. Judges can connect juvenile delinquents with rehabilitative 
resources but still have discretion to place violent and repeat offenders in 
DYS facilities at no cost to counties (Moon, Applegate and Latessa 1997). 
RECLAIM Ohio has become a model for incentive-based, juvenile justice 
reinvestment reforms, but only time will tell if it can withstand future 
increases in juvenile crime. 
CALIFORNIA (SLIDING SCALE)
California’s Probation Subsidy Act of 1965 provided the blueprint for financial 
reform in the state’s juvenile justice system. Discontinued in 1978, it was 
replaced by the County Justice System Subvention Program, which gave 
counties grant money to fund community-based programs. Because the 
costs of programming continued to increase while grant allocations remained 
unchanged, however, counties gradually abandoned community-based 
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25 programs (Nieto 1996). It had become more cost-effective for counties to place juvenile offenders in facilities run by the Department of Juvenile 
Facilities (DJF)  than in community programs, because it cost only $25 each 
month per juvenile for DJF placement. The state was accountable for the 
remaining costs (Krisberg et al. 2010). [Note: The California Youth Authority 
(CYA) became the Department of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) in 2005. The newer 
acronym is sometimes used in this report even when referring to events prior 
to 2005.]
As a result, the DJF institutional population increased drastically through the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, until it peaked at 10,122 in 1996; overcrowding 
became a significant issue (Lerner 1986). Meanwhile, the costs to the state 
for youth incarceration had continued to rise. Reports of institutional abuse 
appeared in the media. Advocates urged reform. In response to mounting 
criticism, California passed Senate Bill 681 in 1996. 
Senate Bill 681 created a “sliding scale” fee that required counties to pay for 
DJF placements based on the severity of each juvenile’s offense (Dawood 
2009). Juveniles sent to the DJF were assigned a number from one to seven. 
“One” represented the most serious offender, and “seven” represented the 
least serious offender. Counties were responsible for 100 percent ($2,600 
per month) of the cost of placing a category seven juvenile in a DJF facility, 
75 percent ($1,950 per month) of the costs for incarcerating a category six 
juvenile, and 50 percent ($1,300) of the cost for incarcerating a category five 
juvenile. For juveniles in categories one through four, counties paid a flat fee 
of $150 per month (Legislative Analyst’s Office 1997; Legislative Analyst’s 
Office 2000). 
After the sliding scale was introduced, DJF population decreased each year 
after 1996 (Dawood 2009). In 2010, the juvenile institutional population in 
California had decreased to 1,118 (Juvenile Research Branch 2010), an 89 
percent drop from the 1996 level. 
The reforms have not been entirely successful, however. Although DJF 
population decreased each year after the sliding scale fee was implemented, 
the cost of incarceration grew steadily from 1996 to 2003. The DJF budget 
escalated further from 2003 to 2007, because of a consent decree requiring 
DJF facilities to hire additional medical, mental health, and educational staff 
26 (Krisberg et al. 2010). The high price of staff salaries drove the cost of one DJF placement to $225,000 per year, and because state rules made it difficult 
to trim the DJF workforce, the costs are expected to continue rising (Ferriss 
2010). In 2008, California spent $200 million more to incarcerate juvenile 
offenders than it did in 1996, when the institutional youth population was five 
times larger (Little Hoover Commission 2008). 
Furthermore, the Division of Juvenile Justice, which oversees the Department 
of Juvenile Facilities, has been criticized for dismal conditions inside its 
juvenile institutions and a lack of rehabilitative success. There have been 
allegations of abuse and violence, and evaluations of state facilities indicated 
that some juveniles were locked in their cells for 23 hours a day (Office of the 
Inspector General 2000). Juveniles released from DJF confinement in fiscal 
year 2004-05 had an 81 percent re-arrest rate and more than 56 percent 
were re-incarcerated within three years of release (California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation 2010). 
California’s finances seem likely to force even more reforms. The state 
currently spends more than $9 billion annually on corrections and 
rehabilitation (Brown 2011), of which nearly $1 billion is allocated to juvenile 
justice. Approximately half of that $1 billion is spent on incarcerating a small 
number of juvenile offenders, while the other half is spent on community-
based programs for nearly 100,000 juveniles (Little Hoover Commission 
2008). As state officials grapple with a budget deficit of $16 billion (Smith 
2012), the state has begun to explore legislation that would decentralize 
its juvenile justice system and allow counties to develop and manage 
community-based supervision and treatment programs that keep juveniles 
out of state facilities. In addition, the District Attorneys Association has 
threatened to start filing all juvenile petitions in adult court, to avoid having 
to shoulder the cost of providing services to youth in the juvenile justice 
system. 
NORTH CAROLINA
As of the late 1990s, the functions of juvenile justice in North Carolina 
were divided between two state departments. The Division of Youth 
Services managed juvenile facilities and community-based programs, while 
27 the Juvenile Services Division handled intake, probation, and aftercare. Separation made it difficult for the departments to share records, collaborate 
on individual juvenile interventions, and provide continuity of services. The 
dual system also proved to be inefficient cost-wise. In 1997, the Governor’s 
Commission on Juvenile Justice and Crime conducted an evaluation of the 
juvenile justice system, and its findings provided the impetus for reform. 
In 1998, the General Assembly passed the Juvenile Justice Reform Act, 
based on recommendations from the Governor’s Commission report. The 
Reform Act established the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention (DJJDP) to manage the duties of the two former departments. 
The governor oversees the DJJDP, which is tasked with developing juvenile 
prevention and rehabilitation services, creating a match-based funding 
formula for counties that utilize such services, and reporting annually to the 
General Assembly about the effectiveness and cost-benefit of each program 
(Mason 1999). 
To be eligible for state funding, counties must appoint a Juvenile Crime 
Prevention Council (JCPC) to manage local juvenile justice operations. 
JCPCs consist of 25 members that (ideally) reflect the ethnic and economic 
composition of the community and include government and criminal justice 
personnel, counselors, health providers, and concerned members of the 
community. JCPCs are responsible for assessing juvenile needs, providing 
treatment to meet their needs, evaluating treatment programs, submitting 
annual proposals, and securing program funding (Mason 1999). JCPCs also 
encourage community members to participate in monthly meetings to discuss 
methods for reducing and preventing juvenile crime. 
In addition, the Juvenile Justice Reform Act created a mechanism for cost-
sharing between the state and participating counties. To receive state funds, 
JCPCs are required to submit a proposal to the DJJDP that specifies programs 
the county intends to fund, as well as the risk and protective factors that 
the programs address. The DJJDP then calculates an amount to be allocated 
to each approved county in the following fiscal year. Counties are required 
to match a certain percentage of DJJDP funds, typically between 10 percent 
and 30 percent (Durham County Juvenile Crime Prevention Council 2011). 
Currently, all 100 counties in North Carolina participate and receive funding 
from DJJDP. The DJJDP allocated more than $23 million annually to subsidize 
28 community-based youth programming throughout the state in 2008-2009 (North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
2009). 
The partnership between the DJJDP and JCPCs has stimulated North Carolina 
counties to create a range of interventions, including mentoring, skill 
building, restitution, mediation, day services, clinical assessment, community 
service, and home-based counseling. An intake counselor makes the initial 
determination regarding diversion. If a court-referred juvenile is a violent or 
repeat offender, diversion is not an option. If the intake counselor diverts a 
juvenile, he or she must refer the youth to appropriate programs available in 
that jurisdiction. The intake officer then monitors the juvenile for six months, 
and if the juvenile and his or her parents/guardians comply with the diversion 
plan, the intake officer may close his or her file (Mason 1999). In fiscal year 
2009-2010, JCPC community-based programs served 30,393 juveniles (North 
Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 2011). 
In addition to funding community-based programs, the DJJDP manages 
nine youth detention centers, and seven juvenile facilities known as Youth 
Development Centers (YDC). The purpose of YDC facilities is to prepare 
juveniles to re-enter the community through treatment, education, and 
mentoring services. Juvenile offenders between the ages of 10 and 15 are 
eligible for placement in a YDC, while offenders age 16 and up are legally 
considered adults in North Carolina. Under the Reform Act, judges can only 
send juveniles who commit a serious or violent offense or those who are 
chronic offenders to a YDC facility (North Carolina Department of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention).  
Since passage of the Reform Act, juvenile delinquency rates and youth 
incarceration have dropped to ten-year lows. In 1998, there were 1,360 
juveniles in YDC facilities; five years later, the YDC population had declined 
65 percent (North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention 2010), and there were only 357 juveniles in YDC facilities as 
of 2010 (North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention 2011). 
Shortly after a 2005 state audit revealed unsafe environments and 
punishment-focused facilities, North Carolina closed several of its rundown 
29 YDC facilities and replaced them with five treatment-based facilities. The new facilities are much smaller (one has 96 beds, the other four have 32 
beds), dispersed geographically across the state, and offer therapeutic 
and community-oriented environments that encourage education and 
rehabilitation. Compared to juveniles released from standard care facilities, 
there was a 73 percent decrease in the re-arrest of juveniles released 
from the new facilities, and a 560 percent increase in juveniles who sought 
education beyond high school following their release from the treatment-
based facilities (National Juvenile Justice Network 2008). 
Despite the decline in the YDC population, however, budget savings have 
not materialized. The DJJDP spent more than $44 million on YDC facilities in 
fiscal year 2009-10, which represents the highest-ever DJJDP appropriation 
and 29 percent of the total DJJDP budget (North Carolina Department of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 2011). This is important because 
the more funds that the DJJDP spends on YDC facilities, the less money there 
is available for education and treatment services, community programs, and 
Juvenile Crime Prevention Councils. 
The Juvenile Justice Reform Act undoubtedly increased local alternatives to 
incarceration, but budget deficits threaten future developments. The state 
recently cut $28 million from the DJJDP budget. In fiscal year 2010-2011, 
the DJJDP’s approximate budget was $146 million, which was more than 16 
percent less than its 2009 budget (North Carolina Department of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention 2011). The cuts have made it difficult for 
the DJJDP to expand juvenile rehabilitation programs, but the department 
continues to fund evidence-based programming for adjudicated and at-risk 
juveniles. 
In December of 2010, Governor Perdue proposed merging the Department 
of Correction, the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, and 
the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (DJJDP) 
into a new “Department of Public Safety” (Christensen 2011). Critics were 
concerned that this change could shift the focus of juvenile justice away from 
rehabilitation to sanctions and warehousing youth. 
30 DESCHUTES COUNTY, OREGON
In the 1970s, Oregon’s correctional population and the costs of incarceration 
were steadily rising. To address these problems, Oregon enacted the 
Community Corrections Act (CCA) in 1977. The CCA allocated state funds 
to counties to fund existing county programs and develop additional 
community-based alternatives to incarceration. The CCA gave counties the 
option to manage the programs and services for offenders under parole and 
probation supervision (Criminal Justice Commission 2010). 
The transformation from state to local justice systems instigated further 
reform initiatives in Oregon, including Deschutes County’s decision 
to organize its juvenile justice system around “community justice.” 
Community justice is based on citizen and government collaboration, 
offender accountability, restoration of the harm resulting from crime, and 
strengthening community wellbeing (Martin 2002). Instead of spending 
money on prison beds and new prisons, community justice officials fund 
education and local rehabilitation services, so that juveniles can remain close 
to their families and connected with their communities. 
In 1997, the Oregon state legislature passed House Bill 3737 to further 
the goals of community youth justice. Known as the Community Youth 
Investment Project (CYIP), the legislation applied only to Deschutes County 
for a six-year pilot period. [Note: The CYIP expired in 2003, and Deschutes 
County did not continue the program.]  
The CYIP gave the county financial responsibility for handling adjudicated 
juveniles, and created incentives to reduce the use of juvenile incarceration. 
The county was obligated to cover the entire cost of out-of-home placements, 
but for each juvenile diverted from the system, the state paid the county up 
to 100 percent of the annual costs of placement, or approximately $48,000 
per juvenile (Maloney and Holcomb 2001).
Deschutes County allocated about 70 percent of state reimbursements 
to juvenile treatment programs and reinvested the remaining funds in 
prevention programs, including early intervention, parent training, home 
visits, academic tutoring, and after-school activities (Maloney and Holcomb 
2001). To participate, a juvenile had to be referred to the legal system; 
after this, the juvenile, his or her family, and state and county service 
31 providers met to decide on an intervention plan. The committee was to forward a recommendation to the district attorney, who could accept the 
recommendation or offer the juvenile court judge a revised referral. The 
judge had the final determination on the course of diversion. 
Juveniles admitted to the diversion program spent four months in a secure 
residential facility, where staff continually assessed them and provided them 
with academic and interpersonal support. Following their release, juveniles 
were placed in intensive aftercare, which included work services, competency 
development, tutoring, home visits, or after-school programs (Maloney and 
Holcomb 2001). The diversion process ensured that adjudicated juveniles 
were evaluated and given appropriate services to promote rehabilitation. 
From 1997 to 2001, Deschutes County received $1.7 million in state money 
to fund the CYIP. A portion was used to house juveniles in local detention 
facilities, and the remaining funds were reinvested in community-based 
intervention and prevention services. The reinvestments allowed for a 
rapid expansion of community-based services, and within two years of 
the enactment of the CYIP, Deschutes County had reduced its institutional 
youth population by 72 percent (Martin 2002). The amount of state funding 
Deschutes County received decreased from 2001 until 2003, when the CYIP 
expired. 
The CYIP also appeared to improve the success rate of juveniles who 
participated in diversion programs. Although the number of juveniles served 
through CYIP from 1998 to early 2001 was small, 82 percent successfully 
completed the program. Of those, 49 percent were on pace to graduate 
high school and another 20 percent completed their GED while enrolled in 
the program (Maloney and Holcomb 2001). One year after completing the 
program, nearly two-thirds of juveniles had no new criminal referrals.
External evaluations showed less promising results. One assessment of 
the CYIP found that although the programs were more cost-effective than 
placement in a state institution, the recidivism rate for juveniles who 
successfully completed the program was higher (67 percent) than for 
juveniles released from state commitment (58 percent). However, due to 
the small sample and because the comparison groups were not matched in 
any way, the findings lacked reliability and generalizability (Hannay 2004). 
32 Recent evaluations show that over the past decade, delinquent referrals decreased 13 percent, and the county’s juvenile recidivism rate decreased 
nine percent (Deschutes County 2010), even as the county population grew 
significantly. Since juvenile crime has also dropped nationwide, however, it is 
unclear if the CYIP is responsible for these results. Furthermore, because the 
CYIP’s treatment programs only resemble evidence-based models and are 
not based on them (Hannay 2004), it is difficult for evaluators to compare 
the effectiveness of Deschutes County programs with proven prevention 
programs. 
Deschutes County’s growing population strained county resources and halted 
the expansion of CYIP in Deschutes County (Martin 2002); funding problems 
also hindered its expansion into other Oregon counties. Despite these 
obstacles, Deschutes County’s CYIP reduced the county’s juvenile justice 
expenditures and the time that juveniles spent in state facilities, allowing 
the county to reinvest savings on state incarceration in community-based 
intervention and prevention programs. 
ILLINOIS
Before its experiment in reform, the Illinois juvenile justice system faced 
circumstances similar to those in Ohio prior to the initiation of RECLAIM 
Ohio. There were financial incentives for counties to incarcerate juveniles 
because the state, not counties, was responsible for the costs. Illinois 
counties had few community-based alternatives available and lacked the 
necessary resources to develop such programming, so judges repeatedly 
placed adjudicated juveniles in secure facilities maintained by the Illinois 
Department of Juvenile Justice (IDJJ). 
Each year from 2000 to 2004, nearly 1,800 juveniles were incarcerated at 
an annual cost of more than $70,000 per juvenile, for a total of over $100 
million (Illinois Department of Human Services 2008a). 
Young people were regularly incarcerated in IDJJ facilities regardless of 
their offense throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2004, for example, 
one-third of youth committed to the IDJJ were sent for a court-ordered 
mental health evaluation, and nearly half were sent for a property offense 
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(Tyler, Ziedenberg and Lotke 2006), while fewer than 20 percent were 
incarcerated for a serious or violent offense. As a result, the three-year 
juvenile recidivism rate remained around 50 percent from the early 1990s 
through 2005 (Illinois Department of Human Services 2008b; Illinois 
Department of Human Services 2010). The negative effects and high costs of 
incarceration led state policymakers to pursue a more responsible and cost-
effective way of handling juvenile delinquents.
In 2004, the Illinois General Assembly passed Redeploy Illinois, modeled 
on RECLAIM Ohio, to serve youth offenders ages 13 to 18. The primary 
objective of Redeploy Illinois was to diminish state costs by reducing 
IDJJ commitments and to reinvest the money saved in community-based 
alternatives. Redeploy also aimed to ensure community safety, offender 
accountability, treatment in the least restrictive environment, and juvenile 
skills training that facilitated responsible development. Local communities 
were encouraged to contribute to the legislative decision-making and the 
transition from state placement to community-based treatment (Tyler, 
Ziedenberg and Lotke 2006). 
To participate in Redeploy, counties had to submit a budget and proposed 
plan of services to the State Department of Human Services, which could 
accept or reject the county’s proposal. Within the first year of participation, 
counties had to agree to reduce their IDJJ commitments by 25 percent of the 
average of the previous three years, excluding the small number of offenders 
who commit violent felonies (Tyler, Ziedenberg and Lotke 2006). Redeploy 
required the state to reimburse participating counties that successfully 
managed juvenile offenders in their communities in lieu of incarceration. 
Counties were given the autonomy to develop their own unique programs to 
promote rehabilitation; in the event that a county exceeded the number of 
allowable commitments to IDJJ facilities, it would be required to compensate 
the IDJJ $4,000 per commitment, and $2,000 per court evaluation (Illinois 
Department of Human Services 2008a).
thE primary objEctivE of rEdEploy illinois 
was to diminish statE costs by rEducing idjj 
commitmEnts and to rEinvEst thE monEy savEd in 
community-basEd altErnativEs. 
34 In January 2005, four sites participated in the pilot phase of Redeploy: Macon County, Peoria County, St. Clair County, and the 2nd Judicial Circuit. During 
the first year of operation, Illinois budgeted $2 million for Redeploy pilot sites 
(Tyler, Ziedenberg and Lotke 2006), which the sites used to develop a variety 
of community-based programs, including -- but not limited to -- assessment 
screening, Aggression Replacement Training, Functional Family Therapy, 
cognitive education and treatment, life skills training, substance abuse and 
mental health treatment, home detention, psychological evaluations, and 
community service programs (Illinois Department of Human Services 2007). 
The funding for Redeploy has fluctuated since its founding. The initial $2 
million investment dropped to $1.5 million in 2006, then rose to $2.3 
million in fiscal year 2007 (New York State Juvenile Justice Advisory Group 
2010). In 2008, the Redeploy Illinois Oversight Board (RIOB) recruited five 
more jurisdictions to participate in the program -- Kankakee County, Lee 
County, McLean County, Madison County, and the 4th Judicial Circuit (Illinois 
Department of Human Services 2010) -- but the Board was only able to offer 
sites a total of $3.2 million in 2009 (New York State Juvenile Justice Advisory 
Group 2010). 
The cost of serving one juvenile through Redeploy programs initially ranged 
from $4,000 and $6,000 per year (Juvenile Justice Initiative 2006), and 
currently ranges from $3,000 to $10,000 per juvenile (Illinois Department of 
Human Services 2010) – far less than the $70,000 it costs to place a youth in 
an IDJJ facility. After three years of operation, Redeploy diverted 382 youth 
from IDJJ placement, and the state saved an estimated $18.7 million (Illinois 
Department of Human Services 2008b). 
The RIOB conducted a three-year assessment of Redeploy sites in 2008. 
The assessment analyzed county data, self-assessments, case studies, and 
program accomplishments. RIOB staff met with stakeholders, including legal 
professionals, probation personnel, service providers, participating juveniles 
and parents of juveniles involved in the program (Illinois Department of 
Human Services 2008b). The RIOB subsequently recommended that the 
state expand the use of psychological evaluations, develop methods for 
assessing program outcomes, and recruit additional stakeholders (e.g., 
school officials, members of the faith community) to participate in Redeploy. 
35 Not all counties have been successful. Although a majority of the participating counties have reduced their IDJJ commitments by at least 
25 percent, not all did. Cook County, the most populous county in the 
state, began receiving Redeploy funding in December 2007, and adopted a 
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care Program as its primary intervention, 
because it had been shown to be effective in Oregon. But Cook County had 
to suspend its participation in Redeploy due to out-of-state staff training 
requirements, a low number of referrals, and an inability to reduce IDJJ 
commitments (Illinois Department of Human Services 2008b). In part 
because of the difficulties faced by Cook County, the RIOB established 
planning grants of up to $10,000 to offer counties the opportunity to explore 
Redeploy before committing to it (Illinois Department of Human Services 
2008b). 
Illinois counties depend on consistent state funding to develop and maintain 
community-based alternatives. For example, Kankakee County was awarded 
a $208,000 Redeploy Illinois grant in 2009, but ultimately received only 
$87,000, which was not enough to cover the cost of its juvenile services 
(Kankakee County Board 2010). In 2010, therefore, Kankakee County 
terminated its participation in Redeploy.
Redeploy continues to expand, reduce juvenile incarceration, and reallocate 
savings toward community-based youth programming. In 2009, the 
Governor signed Public Act 95-1050, authorizing every county in the state to 
participate in Redeploy Illinois at their discretion (Redeploy Illinois 2010). As 
of 2011, Redeploy has served 27 of 102 Illinois counties and diverted almost 
800 juveniles from IDJJ placement (Illinois Government News Network 
2011). The State is even considering expanding Redeploy beyond juvenile 
justice. In 2009, the state passed the Crime Reduction Act, which offers 
financial incentives to counties that shift their non-violent adult offenders 
from prisons to diversionary and community-based programs (Adult Redeploy 
Illinois Oversight Board 2010).
FLORIDA
Florida has consistently had one of the highest populations of incarcerated 
juveniles in the nation. In 2006, Florida had the third-highest number 
36 of juveniles in state custody, with more than 6,000 total commitments (Sickmund, Sladky and Kang 2008) – most of them for misdemeanor or 
non-criminal offenses, like curfew violation and truancy. Because of the high 
cost and rates of recidivism associated with residential commitment, the 
Florida Legislature and the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) launched the 
Redirection program in 2004. 
Redirection’s goals are to divert low-level juvenile offenders from residential 
placement and reduce juvenile justice expenditures by offering juvenile 
courts community-based treatment options for teens who commit minor 
offenses. Primary funding for the program comes from state and taxpayer 
funds, but some private organizations (Annie E. Casey Foundation) 
and federal agencies (federal stimulus grant, Perkins grant) contribute 
supplemental funds, and state businesses like Workforce Florida offer grants 
to help with job placement (Florida Department of Juvenile Justice 2010). 
Florida Redirection consists of two evidence-based treatment options: Multi-
systemic Therapy (MST) and Functional Family Therapy (FFT). The Florida 
Legislature and Department of Juvenile Justice selected these programs 
because the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(OJJDP) identified both as effective in reducing recidivism for violent 
offenders (Office of Program Policy Analysis & Government Accountability 
2010). MST and FFT are intensive treatments provided in the homes of 
juveniles and are geared toward families who are reluctant to participate. 
Florida initially piloted Redirection in three counties and limited participation 
to minor probation violators. By 2006, the program accepted all non-violent 
juvenile offenders, and more counties have adopted Redirection every year 
since its inception. As of 2008, Redirection operated in 41 of 67 Florida 
counties (Office of Program Policy Analysis & Government Accountability 
2010). 
The drop in crime rates had some influence, but Redirection appears to have 
been successful: it reduced the number of youth incarcerated, saved the 
state money, and improved juvenile rehabilitation. In fiscal year 2008-2009, 
the DJJ admitted 6,587 juveniles to residential programs, 28 percent fewer 
juveniles than it admitted in 2003-2004 (Florida Department of Juvenile 
Justice 2011). Florida has since reduced its residential bed space to 4,146 
37 juvenile beds as of 2011 to further condense the youth residential population. The state currently utilizes approximately 90 percent of its operational bed 
space (Florida Department of Juvenile Justice 2011).
 Redirection is also cost-effective. From its inception through the end of 
2009, Redirection programs cost just under $30 million. If the state had 
placed all the juveniles served through Redirection in residential facilities 
instead, the cost to the state -- based on the average length of stay -- would 
have been $81 million. By 2010, therefore, Redirection had generated more 
than $51 million in savings (Office of Program Policy Analysis & Government 
Accountability 2010). 
Furthermore, evaluations indicate that many juveniles are better served 
through Redirection than residential placement. By the end of 2009, 
Redirection served 3,956 juveniles, and 2,821 (71 percent) successfully 
completed it; those who completed it were less likely to be arrested, 
especially for a violent felony. Program data indicate that those who complete 
Redirection are nine percent less likely to be arrested for a criminal offense 
than juveniles released from a residential facility. What’s more, high-risk 
youth who complete Redirection programs are 31 percent less likely to be 
rearrested than high-risk juveniles released from a residential facility (Office 
of Program Policy Analysis & Government Accountability 2010).
Though the results show promise, Redirection will need to be evaluated more 
thoroughly. In addition to recidivism, future evaluations should consider 
success rates such as school attendance and performance, length of time in 
employment, and involvement in pro-social activities. 
Nevertheless, Redirection has provided rehabilitation options for juveniles 
and saved the state millions. Due to its success, the Florida DJJ is considering 
expanding the program to include more serious offenders. It also plans 
to expand Redirection statewide, but recent budget cuts could make this 
difficult. In 2010, the state cut $16 million from the DJJ budget. Florida 
spends $11.5 million on Redirection programs and $242 million to operate 
juvenile facilities, but it is unknown how the budget cuts will impact 




As violent youth crime escalated in Texas in the 1980s, more and more 
youth were committed to state juvenile facilities run by the Texas Youth 
Commission (TYC). From 1988 to 1992, there was a 161 percent increase in 
violent juvenile referrals, and a 285 percent increase in juveniles committed 
for a violent offense (Texas Youth Commission 2010a); meanwhile, the 
population of juveniles in TYC custody continued to grow, before peaking 
at 5,646 in 2000 (Levin 2010a). Between 2000 and 2007, more than 2,000 
youth were sent to TYC facilities every year (Texas Youth Commission 
2010b), of whom half were non-violent offenders (Levin 2010b). 
The cost of placing juveniles in TYC facilities has continued to grow. In 2008, 
at a daily rate of $270.49 per juvenile, it cost nearly $100,000 annually to 
incarcerate one juvenile (Legislative Budget Board 2009). Two years later, 
the daily cost to incarcerate one youth increased to $359.58, equating to an 
annual cost of $131,246 per commitment (Legislative Budget Board 2011a). 
In spite of their widespread use, the TYC facilities rarely provided juvenile 
wards with the services they needed to rehabilitate, and youth were often 
unsuccessful after release. Nearly 57 percent of juveniles released from 
TYC facilities in 2007 were rearrested within one year, and 49 percent were 
re-incarcerated within three years (Texas Juvenile Probation Commission and 
Texas Youth Commission 2007). On top of that, media investigations and 
parental complaints revealed incidents of youth abuse inside TYC facilities.  
Saddled with rising incarceration costs, high recidivism rates, and bad 
publicity, the legislature was faced with a choice in 2007, when Texas officials 
estimated that the state would need to spend $2 billion over the next five 
years to construct new facilities and beds to meet a projected increase in 
the youth and adult offender population (Right on Crime 2010). Rather 
than expend resources to construct new prisons and new prison beds, 
rathEr than ExpEnd additional rEsourcEs to 
construct nEw prisons and nEw prison bEds, thE 
tExas lEgislaturE optEd to rEinvEst a portion 
of thE funds proposEd for construction in 
altErnativE stratEgiEs. 
39 the Texas legislature opted to reinvest a portion of the funds proposed for construction in alternative strategies. That year, Texas committed $241 
million to strengthen existing drug and mental health treatment programs for 
incarcerated youth and adults and persons released from confinement. 
The state saw positive results over the next two years. By halting the 
construction of new prisons, the reinvestment generated budget savings 
of $444 million in the following fiscal year (Council of State Governments 
Justice Center 2007). Crime decreased statewide and the number of parole 
and probation violations declined. Predictions about the rate at which the 
state prison population would increase were revised downward significantly; 
current forecasts now predict it will grow at 10 percent of the rate estimated 
in 2007 (Council of State Governments Justice Center 2009). 
In 2009, the TJPC introduced the Commitment Reduction Program, which 
seeks to fund community-based alternatives to youth incarceration and 
encourage counties to reduce their TYC placements. In order to participate 
in the program, county probation departments propose goals for reducing 
TYC placements, and objectives for achieving those goals. Each county is 
expected to meet reduction targets set by the state, which are tied to a 
statewide cap of 1,783 total commitments (Levin 2010b). 
Counties approved for the Commitment Reduction Program receive additional 
grant money from the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission (TJPC) to fund 
community-based youth programming. County proposals for supervision 
and rehabilitation programming must be evidence-based and must have 
demonstrated prior success in other communities. Participating jurisdictions 
are subject to periodic state monitoring and must submit continual progress 
and financial accountability reports to the TJPC. If a county commits more 
juveniles to TYC than allowed by its cap, it risks losing TJPC funding the 
following year. For every commitment over the statewide cap, the TJPC is 
required to pay the TYC $51,100 per year (Eighty-first Legislature 2009). 
Since the Commitment Reduction Program started, the state has saved more 
than $200 million in taxpayer costs, and commitments to the TYC have also 
declined. In 2007, the TYC housed more than 5,000 juveniles and had 4,290 
staff positions; there are now 1,620 juveniles in TYC facilities and 3,405 
staff positions. Commitments to TYC facilities dropped another 40 percent 
40 in 2010, due in large part to the Commitment Reduction Program (Levin 2010a). Because further reductions are expected in the near future, Texas 
plans to close three of its ten TYC facilities by 2013 (Mitchell 2011). As a 
result, the state legislature was able to cut TYC funding by more than $100 
million between 2008 and 2010. A portion of these savings was reinvested in 
local probation and community-based programs to keep juveniles out of TYC 
facilities (Levin 2010b). 
Even before the creation of the Commitment Reduction Program, the 
legislature had already begun to invest in alternatives to confinement. 
From 2006 to 2010, the state gave more than $100 million to juvenile 
probation departments to fund new programs and improve existing 
programming. Because counties are responsible for 65 percent of the cost of 
juvenile probation and the state funds 34 percent (the federal government 
covers the remaining one percent), additional financial support has been 
beneficial (Levin 2010b). Counties across Texas have developed a variety 
of programming options to address the needs of at-risk and adjudicated 
youth. Examples of community-based programs include anger management, 
cognitive behavioral therapy, victim restitution programs, drug and mental 
health treatment, youth mentoring, life skills training, vocational and 
educational programs, community service, electronic monitoring, and 
ongoing evaluations of program impact (Levin 2010b). 
To reform its juvenile justice system and reduce budget expenditures, then, 
Texas reinvested in alternative-to-incarceration programs. In addition to 
redirecting monies that could have gone to building more prison beds, the 
state offered counties financial incentives and encouraged the development 
of community-based programs for at-risk 
juveniles through its Commitment Reduction 
Program. Of course, continued state and 
county budget cuts may make it difficult 
for local jurisdictions to supervise and treat 
at-risk juveniles over the long term (Mitchell 
2011). To date, however, Texas policymakers 
have strongly supported financial reform 
and juvenile rehabilitation despite financial 
difficulties. 
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Realignment shifts responsibility for managing young offenders from states 
to the counties. Realignment strategies are based on the premises that local 
communities are in the best position to provide extensive and cost-effective 
supervision and treatment services for juvenile offenders, and that youth 
are more successful when supervised and treated closer to their homes and 
families. 
Effective realignment depends on cooperation and communication between 
state and county agencies. Counties that assume responsibility for juvenile 
justice need financial support and adequate time to develop community-
based alternatives to state placement. California counties experienced many 
problems during Governor Schwarzenegger’s 2007 realignment transition 
because they had minimal time to develop community-based supervision 
and treatment programs before the state removed institutional placement 
options (Dawood 2009). Realigned counties also lacked assistance and state 
oversight, which are necessary to ensure that counties have support and are 
held financially accountable. 
Successful realignment strategies often 
include components of resolution and 
reinvestment. As long as state facilities 
remain open, counties will use them as 
placements for serious youth offenders. 
Closing state facilities leaves counties 
with no other option but to assume 
responsibility for all youth offenders. 
Whether counties develop community-
based alternatives or build local 
facilities to house youth placements, 
resolution inevitably localizes juvenile 
justice. Reinvestment strategies in the 
form of financial incentives can also be 
a tool to achieve realignment. If the 
state rewards counties for developing 
community-based supervision and 
treatment options that enable juveniles 
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to receive rehabilitation close to home, counties will be more prepared to 
assume complete responsibility for adjudicated juveniles.  
Realignment may be the most effective strategy for juvenile justice reform, 
because it withstands fluctuations in youth crime. This is partly because 
it takes more political effort and financial resources to reverse than do 
resolution or reinvestment strategies. As a result, in a realigned system, 
any increases in crime are less likely to result in higher incarceration rates, 
and counties are obligated to continue to handle juveniles using the most 
rehabilitative and cost-effective means available – i.e., locally.
WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN
While significant budget deficits have forced many state governments around 
the country to seriously consider realigning their juvenile justice systems 
in recent years, realignment is not new – and not limited to state-level 
policymaking. Beginning in 1996, Wayne County, Michigan began the process 
of transforming its juvenile justice system from one that was state-controlled 
and focused on incarceration, to a local, self-sustained system based on 
rehabilitation.  
Wayne County has the highest juvenile population in Michigan. Although it 
does not have the highest per capita crime rate, the overall amount of adult 
and juvenile crime in Wayne County is greater than any other Michigan 
county, and has been for more than a decade. In 2005, Wayne was home to 
22 percent of the state’s juvenile population, but accounted for 27 percent of 
all juvenile arrests (Elam et al. 2008). 
In Wayne County in the 1990s, the average daily juvenile population in public 
secure facilities was 700; the county placed more than 1,000 juveniles in 
private facilities and sent approximately 200 juveniles to out-of-state facilities 
throughout the 1990s (Wayne County Children & Family Services 2010b). 
Lacking intermediate options for juvenile offenders, county judges placed 
many of them in state facilities. More than half of all Michigan youth sent 
to out-of-home placements came from Wayne County, and a majority were 
sent for minor or non-criminal offenses. A study conducted during this time 
indicated that two-thirds of Wayne County juveniles sent to a state facility 
were committed for a technical violation of a court-ordered condition (Wayne 
County Children & Family Services 2010a). By the late 1990s, incarceration 
was the conventional outcome for juvenile delinquents. 
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This practice was expensive. On the one hand, although every other county 
in Michigan was required to pay the state at least half the cost of juvenile 
confinement, a legislative agreement enabled Wayne County to pay a much 
smaller percentage of juvenile confinement (Allen-Meares and Garvin 2000). 
Unsurprisingly, then, through 1999, Wayne County sent more juveniles to 
state facilities than every other Michigan county. Nevertheless, although 
Wayne County had less financial accountability for juvenile confinement than 
other Michigan counties, it spent approximately $150 million annually over 20 
years to incarcerate juvenile offenders – and during this period, the costs of 
residential care more than doubled (Latona, Smith and Chaney 2006). 
Nor were conditions inside state juvenile facilities conducive to rehabilitation. 
Many juveniles slept on floors while waiting for a bed to open up (Kresnak 
2002). One facility showed signs of structural deterioration and ruptured 
plumbing. Staff were overworked and exhausted, which led to inadequate 
management of youth wards. Facility managers gauged juvenile progress by 
their compliance with the rules, rather than by assessing the behavioral and 
emotional changes that would indicate rehabilitation (Wayne County Children 
& Family Services 2010b). 
The director of what was then known as the Michigan Department of Social 
Services, set the stage for structural reform. In 1996, he offered grant 
money to counties willing to take responsibility for juvenile delinquents 
(Kresnak 2002). Wayne was the only county to sign an agreement and 
transfer responsibility from the state for managing its adjudicated juveniles.
But the county was apparently unready to handle these youth effectively. 
In 1999, the State Auditor General audited Wayne County’s juvenile 
division, and found that it was not in compliance with federal requirements.  
in 1999, thE statE auditor gEnEral auditEd 
waynE county’s juvEnilE division, and found 
that it was not in compliancE with fEdEral 
rEquirEmEnts.  thE primary juvEnilE facility 
in thE county was ovEr capacity and facility 
conditions did not mEEt fEdEral standards. 
44 The primary juvenile facility in the county was over capacity and facility conditions did not meet federal standards. If Wayne County did not address 
these problems, it faced a federal takeover of its juvenile justice services 
(Latona, Smith and Chaney 2006). There were additional concerns, because 
county judges sent some juveniles to out-of-state facilities, and two-thirds 
of incarcerated juveniles returned to the system within six months of their 
release. Out-of-home placements were failing to help adjudicated juveniles 
finish school, secure a job, or maintain responsible lives. These concerns 
compelled Wayne County to implement reforms. 
Wayne County reformed its juvenile justice system through a series of steps. 
With its juvenile intake and detention centers in jeopardy of being shut down 
due to overcrowding, the county agreed to a compromise in which a portion 
of detained juveniles would be kept in home detention by means of electronic 
monitoring (Latona, Smith and Chaney 2006). To further relieve detention 
overcrowding, local officials reduced the delays between arrest and pre-trial 
hearings to a maximum of five days. This alteration promptly decreased the 
youth detention population by 35 percent and eliminated the threat of federal 
takeover (Latona, Smith and Chaney 2006). 
Second, the county restructured its financial accountability to the state to 
give it fiscal incentives for using community-based programs instead of 
secure placement and by making Wayne County accountable for half the cost 
of any youth confined by the state (Wayne County Children & Family Services 
2010b). 
The Juvenile Services Division in Wayne County oversaw the realignment. 
During the realignment – which Wayne County dubbed its “human 
investment system” – the county privatized its juvenile justice system by 
establishing the Juvenile Assessment Center/Care Management Organization 
(JAC/CMO). The county contracted with the JAC/CMO, which is a collaboration 
of substance abuse and mental health providers and juvenile justice 
personnel, to provide supervision and services for juvenile offenders (Wayne 
County Children & Family Services 2010b). Among other benefits, the JAC/
CMO system created a new stream of funding. Federal guidelines prohibit the 
state and counties from using Medicaid funds for juvenile confinement, but 
Medicaid can be spent toward supervision and treatment through private or 
non-profit providers. The revised system generated significant savings for 
taxpayers (Kresnak 2002). 
45 The Juvenile Assessment Center (JAC) became — and remains — the entry point for juvenile diversions. The JAC is an independent, non-profit agency 
responsible for youth assessments at entry and throughout the duration of 
a young person’s involvement in the program. After the initial assessment, 
the JAC refers each juvenile to one of five Care Management Organizations 
(CMOs) dispersed across Wayne County based on zip code. The JAC is in 
charge of monitoring and reviewing CMOs every six months, communicating 
information on each juvenile’s progress to his or her family, and authorizing 
changes in service plans when necessary.
CMOs have the responsibility and the autonomy to assign juveniles to a case 
manager and to plan service interventions for youths and their families. 
Each CMO supervises between 300 and 500 juveniles (Kresnak 2002). CMOs 
use community-based treatment options whenever possible, but if youth 
require more restrictive interventions, CMOs are accountable for the costs 
of confinement. As an incentive, CMOs are rewarded with bonuses when 
juveniles graduate from high school or remain drug-free (Kresnak 2002). 
Recently, Wayne County developed the Juvenile Agency Information System 
(JAIS). The Internet-based system enables vested parties to continuously 
monitor the implementation of daily services, ensure that CMOs and juveniles 
are in compliance with court orders, and assess juvenile progress (Wayne 
County Children & Family Services 2010b). The JAIS is designed to ensure 
that CMOs are accountable to parents of participating juveniles. 
The primary funding source for the JAC/CMO is the Child Care Fund, which is 
an uncapped, 50/50 cost-sharing agreement between the state and Wayne 
County. To be eligible for the funds, Wayne County must submit an annual 
plan and budget proposal to the state Department of Human Services. If 
approved, the county can bill the state for a 50 percent reimbursement of the 
cost of eligible juvenile services (Wayne County Children & Family Services 
2010b). Examples of eligible services include needs assessment, educational 
support, aggressive drug testing, drug treatment, mental health services, 
and family intervention (Wayne County Children & Family Services 2010a). 
Other funding sources include Federal Title IV-E funds, which the county can 
claim for economically deprived youth, and Medicaid, which covers healthcare 
and behavioral health services (Wayne County Children & Family Services 
2010b). 
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The JAC/CMO system has resulted in significant improvements to Wayne 
County’s juvenile justice system. In 1999, the state and the county spent 
a combined $113 million on out-of-home placements. Within a decade, 
the expenditures for residential placements had fallen to $73 million (New 
York State Juvenile Justice Advisory Group 2010). Furthermore, during its 
first five years of operation, the costs for the JAC/CMO system decreased 
each year, and CMO expenditures continue to decrease (Latona, Smith and 
Chaney 2006). In 2008, the combined spending of the five CMOs was $115 
million. In 2010, CMOs spent $87.5 million (Wayne County Children & Family 
Services 2010b). 
The Wayne County reforms also reduced juvenile incarceration. The average 
daily population of Wayne County juveniles in state facilities dropped from 
906 in 1996 to 40 in 2003 (Kresnak 2002). By 2010, there were only two 
juveniles in a secure facility (Wayne County Children & Family Services 
2010a). Between 1998 and 2009, the number of juvenile delinquents sent 
out-of-state dropped from 200 to 0 (New York State Juvenile Justice Advisory 
Group 2010). 
The recidivism rate indicates that the reforms have been successful. Under 
the old system, nearly two-thirds of juveniles released from state placement 
returned within two years, but the new system halted the trend. CMOs 
served more than 4,000 juveniles in 2010, and of those who participated 
in CMO programs from 2009 to 2010, more than 70 percent successfully 
completed their court-ordered conditions (Wayne County Children & Family 
Services 2010b). 
thE avEragE daily population of waynE county 
juvEnilEs in statE facilitiEs droppEd from 906 in 
1996 to 40 in 2003. by 2010, thErE wErE only 
two juvEnilEs in a sEcurE facility. bEtwEEn 1998 
and 2009, thE numbEr of juvEnilE dElinquEnts 
sEnt out-of-statE droppEd from 200 to 0. 
47 In 2004, external evaluators examined the recidivism rate of 1,900 juveniles released from a CMO and compared this to a group of juveniles released 
from state facilities before Wayne County realigned. The recidivism rate 
for juveniles released from CMOs was less than five percent, while the 
recidivism rate for juveniles released from facilities under the old system 
was greater than 50 percent (Plante & Moran 2006). All told, Wayne County 
juvenile justice reforms have reduced state and county expenditures, nearly 
eliminated the juvenile institutional population, and established privatized 
programs that successfully rehabilitate most teens. 
Wayne County plans to expand its JAC/CMO system. County officials have 
invested the savings from reduced state facility costs into prevention 
services, such as after-school programs, truancy enforcement, and in-school 
social work in areas with the highest juvenile crime. With support from the 
state, Wayne County has realigned its juvenile justice system to create a 
functional, privatized, and cost-effective system that is county-controlled. 
CALIFORNIA
In 2007, California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed legislation to 
address the costs and problems associated with the juvenile justice system. 
Known as “juvenile justice realignment,” Senate Bill 81 differed from the 
1996 sliding scale legislation in that it created strict conditions for placing 
juveniles in state institutions and shifted management and responsibility for a 
majority of juvenile delinquents from the state to the counties. Realignment 
mandated that only those juveniles convicted of sexual, violent, or serious 
offenses -- and those sent to a juvenile facility by an adult court -- would 
be eligible for state confinement (California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation 2010). In addition, juveniles who had been confined for 
any other offense prior to the passage of the bill could be released to the 
jurisdiction of their origin (Dawood 2009). 
Senate Bill 81 requires counties to submit a proposed plan and budget 
for reducing placements in the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). It also 
established the Youthful Offender Block Grant (YOBG) to fund each approved 
county’s development of community-based programs and services for 
juvenile offenders no longer eligible for confinement (Dawood 2009). 
48 The Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) distributes YOBG funds in the amount of $117,000 per juvenile to county probation departments, so that 
they can enhance supervision and offer rehabilitation services (Brown 2011). 
To determine precise county allocations, the $117,000 amount is multiplied 
by the number of youths eligible for realignment in California. The funds are 
then disbursed among the counties based on their share of the state juvenile 
population age 10 to 17 and their felony adjudication rate (Ramadas 2008). 
In addition to managing the YOBG, the CSA also administers the Youthful 
Offender Rehabilitative Facilities Construction grant program, which allocates 
funds for counties to improve and expand local facilities for juvenile offenders 
(Little Hoover Commission 2008). Local facilities are usually smaller, and 
thus more cost-effective, than state facilities and offer county court judges 
restrictive but local options for handling serious juvenile offenders who are 
ineligible for DJF placement. 
The declining number of juveniles in state facilities was a catalyst for 
implementation of realignment. In the past decade, the DJF population 
decreased by 80 percent (Krisberg et al. 2010). The reduction in youth 
confinement, along with lower crime rates and realignment reforms, 
has enabled California to close seven juvenile facilities in the last ten 
years. Currently, there are four state-run facilities remaining that house 
approximately 1,100 youth offenders (Steinhart 2012). 
Despite the fact that the DJF population has been dropping over time, 
county officials have concerns about the availability of local alternatives. 
Governor Schwarzenegger signed Senate Bill 81 on August 26, 2007, and 
it was enacted less than one week later. This left little time for county 
probation departments to design alternatives to DJF placement before 
the bill took effect. Probation departments were forced to accept juvenile 
offenders who would have been sent to DJF previously, and probation 
officers had inadequate time to adapt programs to the influx of new and 
different caseloads (Krisberg et al. 2010). The time constraints and delays 
in initial funding forced counties to forage for resources to quickly develop 
programming options for juvenile offenders. 
There were additional drawbacks. Senate Bill 81 did not specify a system of 
state oversight. Consequently, there were no guidelines for counties to use 
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when planning and developing local services. Because there was no system 
for tracking county expenditures, there was no financial accountability 
(Dawood 2009). Counties were not required to report how they spent grant 
money, and there was no mandate that they report whether or not proposed 
outcomes were being met (Little Hoover Commission 2008). 
Stakeholders in California were also concerned about the prerequisites for 
youth to benefit from county programs set up under realignment. A juvenile’s 
eligibility for a community-based program (in lieu of DJF placement) would 
depend on the most recent offense. Judges do not have to consider prior 
offenses, so violent, repeat, and serious juvenile offenders with a minor 
recent offense could become the responsibility of counties (Krisberg et 
al. 2010). Some judges could ignore the realignment mandate to keep 
eligible juvenile offenders within their jurisdiction. Those in counties with 
high juvenile crime rates (e.g., Los Angeles, San Diego, San Joaquin, Santa 
Clara, Solano, and Tulare) could continue to send juvenile offenders to DJF 
custody, even though their county facilities had more than enough bed space 
(Macallair, McCracken and Teji 2011). 
Governor Brown released a proposal to shut down the Division of Juvenile 
Justice in January of 2013, but backed away from the plan in 2012. If his 
plan had succeeded, juvenile justice in California would have been fully 
realigned because state facilities for juveniles would no longer exist. Closing 
the DJJ could have reduced expenses and provided more rehabilitative 
options for juveniles, and state budget analysts projected that closing the DJJ 
would have saved as much as $250 million per year (Brown 2011). 
govErnor brown rElEasEd a proposal to shut 
down thE division of juvEnilE justicE in january 
of 2013, but backEd away from thE plan in 
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50 Local governments had concerns about the plan to eliminate the DJJ entirely. Without even an option of state facilities for juvenile offenders, 
local governments would have had to accept the transfer of all juveniles who 
were previously being incarcerated. In addition, while the elimination of the 
DJJ would have generated significant savings, it also would have led to the 
elimination of more than 4,000 staff positions (Brown 2011), causing political 
problems for state and local officials. 
Without the option of state facilities for juveniles, advocates worried 
that prosecutors could file more juvenile cases in adult court unless local 
governments were able to create viable sentencing options at the community 
level (Steinhart 2012). Some degree of confinement may be necessary for 
certain offenders, including youth with mental illness and those who commit 
serious or violent offenses. State officials would have had to fund new 
regional facilities for juvenile offenders, or work out sharing agreements 
so that counties without space could send offenders to counties with space 
(Steinhart 2012). 
[Note: Furthermore, in response to reports of overcrowding in California 
prisons, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in May of 2011 that severe prison 
overcrowding was unconstitutional. The ruling was expected to force 
the transfer or release of 33,000 prisoners within two years. California 
accelerated its realignment strategy to enable counties to supervise these 
offenders (Biskupic 2011).] 
TEXAS
In addition to undertaking the reinvestment initiatives described above, 
Texas partially realigned its juvenile justice system in 2007, when lawmakers 
passed Senate Bill 103 to reduce juvenile incarceration. Senate Bill 103 
excludes youth offenders adjudicated for misdemeanors from placement 
in Texas Youth Commission (TYC) facilities, and requires local jurisdictions 
to manage their disposition. This structural realignment of responsibility 
obligates local jurisdictions to supervise and/or treat juvenile misdemeanor 
offenders. Senate Bill 103 also specifies 150 other reform measures, 
including a system of oversight and inspection in TYC facilities, increased 
training requirements for juvenile correctional officers, a mandated juvenile-
to-staff ratio of twelve-to-one inside facilities, and the appointment 
of a caseworker for every juvenile on probation (Yanez-Correa 2011). 
51 Furthermore, the bill reduces the maximum amount of time that juveniles can remain in TYC custody. While the previous age limit was 21, the TYC 
must now release or transfer juveniles to adult prison or parole by the age of 
19 (Levin 2010b). 
To encourage the development of community-based youth programming, 
Senate Bill 103 allocates funds for county probation departments to address 
the needs of juvenile misdemeanor offenders who would have previously 
been placed in TYC custody. The initial statewide allocation was nearly $58 
million from 2008 to 2009, which represented half the cost of committing 
misdemeanor youths who were no longer eligible for TYC placement (Levin 
2010b). Currently, the state contributes to county probation departments 
$51,100 per juvenile successfully diverted from TYC placement, to cover the 
costs of supervision and treatment (Texas Juvenile Probation Commission 
2010). The Legislature allocates additional county funds. In fiscal year 
2008-2009, the State Legislature appropriated $22.5 million for the 
enhancement of community-based programs (Legislative Budget Board 
2009). 
Following the enactment of Senate Bill 103 and in response to reports 
of abuse and poor conditions inside TYC facilities, the state closed four 
maximum-security facilities (National Juvenile Justice Network 2008). 
The TYC population quickly decreased because of the closures and the 
decarceration of misdemeanor offenders. While the TYC population was 
5,646 in 2000, it had dropped to 1,688 one year after the state implemented 
Senate Bill 103 (Levin 2010a; National Juvenile Justice Network 2008). 
Allegations of abuse subsided and programs inside TYC facilities improved. 
In 2011, the State Legislature passed Senate Bill 653, which called for the 
abolition of the TYC and the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission (TJPC)  
by the end of the year. The two agencies were replaced by a single agency, 
the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (JJD), and the central objective of 
the department is to establish a continuum of community and family-based 
alternatives that keep juveniles out of state facilities. Senate Bill 653 places 
emphasis on probation and treatment for youth in their community, and 
allows the state to transfer control of closed facilities to the counties in which 
they are located. Oversight of the JJD and the responsibility for handling 
complaints about its services and facilities will be the responsibility of the 
Office of Independent Ombudsman.
52 The merger of the TYC and TJPC will allow the state to eliminate several redundant positions and save more than $3 million by 2013 (Legislative 
Budget Board 2011b). State senator John Whitmire, author of Senate Bill 
653, believes the bill will also enable the state to safely close at least three 
juvenile facilities. Whitmire estimates that the state will need only 400 youth 
beds in secure facilities, which is more than 1,000 fewer than the current 
number of institutional beds (Old River-Winfree Community News 2011). 
NEW YORK
New York State is currently pursuing a juvenile justice reform approach 
that in some way includes all three strategies (Schiraldi and Richter 2012). 
The Office of Child and Family Services, which oversees the state’s juvenile 
facilities, has been closing institutions for several years, largely due to the 
falling crime rate. The state legislature authorized financial incentives to 
reduce confinement further, and in 2012 the Governor proposed and the 
legislature enacted strutural and organizational reforms known as “Close to 
Home,” which ensure that most youthful offenders from New York City will 
receive services and sanctions in their own communities rather than being 
transported to facilities in upstate New York. 
Gladys Carrion, the commissioner of the New York Office of Child and Family 
Services, moved aggressively to begin closing juvenile facilities across the 
state as the juvenile crime rate fell and demands for bed-space declined. A 
legislative proposal known as “Re-direct New York,” under consideration until 
2011, would have created financial incentives for counties to avoid confining 
youth (i.e., through reinvestment incentives). In subsequent years, the 
high cost of secure placements pushed New York to take additional steps 
to reform its juvenile justice focus from secure placement to alternative 
rehabilitation. 
In 2007, New York incarcerated 3,612 youth (Sickmund 2010), more than 
half were being held for misdemeanor offenses (Task Force on Transforming 
Juvenile Justice 2009). This expensive policy proved untenable. The Office 
of Child and Family Services (OCFS) estimated that it cost up to $266,000 
annually to incarcerate one juvenile in a state institution in New York (New 
York Juvenile Justice Advisory Group 2010). 
53 New York expected to see its institutional population drop by 62 percent between 2002 and 2011 because of the decline in serious juvenile crime. Due 
to the fixed costs of operating institutions, however, the state projected that 
it would spend $23 million more on juvenile facilities in 2011 than it spent in 
2002 (New York Juvenile Justice Advisory Group 2010). Currently, the state 
and counties contribute equally to the cost of juvenile incarceration (Fight 
Crime: Invest in Kids 2011). The state does not cover any of the cost of 
community-based alternatives, so local jurisdictions may actually save money 
by sending juvenile offenders to state institutions. 
Juveniles released from state facilities, however, have a high recidivism rate, 
raising questions about the cost-effectiveness of the system. State statistics 
indicate that 63 percent of youth committed to the state are re-arrested 
within two years of their release (New York Juvenile Justice Advisory Group 
2010). 
Responding to concerns about cost and recidivism, the state initiated several 
changes to reduce youth confinement. Since 2007, the OCFS has closed or 
downsized more than 20 juvenile facilities (National Juvenile Justice Network 
2011) because many operated well below capacity. One facility was empty 
of juvenile wards but remained fully staffed and funded as if it were in 
operation. Other facilities housed as few as one or two juveniles (Mattingly 
and Schiraldi 2010). 
The closures had an immediate effect on youth confinement. By 2010, there 
were 681 juveniles in state custody — nearly 3,000 fewer than in 2007 (New 
York Juvenile Justice Advisory Group 2010) — and evaluators estimated that 
the changes would save the state more than $16 million (Balck 2010). 
New York state legislators have put forward several proposals to reform the 
juvenile justice system. In 2009, Re-direct New York was introduced in the 
House and Senate (A7872/S5378 2009), calling for the creation of financial 
incentives for counties that diverted juveniles from state facilities. Under the 
proposal, a portion of the savings from the closure of secure juvenile facilities 
would be reinvested in community-based youth programming (Fight Crime: 
Invest in Kids 2011). Re-direct New York included a reimbursement clause 
that would have required the state to contribute 65 percent of the cost of 
community-based services to counties that reduced juvenile commitments 
54 by 25 percent. While the bill has yet to pass, it could save the state millions because community-based programs cost less than $20,000 annually per 
youth. 
A New York State senator introduced a bill similar to Re-direct New York in 
early 2011 (New York State Senate 2011). The proposal would have offered 
counties financial incentives to create alternative-to-incarceration programs 
for juveniles. Similar to Re-direct, the bill would have required OCFS to 
reimburse counties for up to 65 percent of the costs of community-based 
programming. Although the proposed bill did not pass the 2011 Assembly, 
state representatives continue to push for juvenile justice reform. 
Governor Cuomo’s 2012 budget proposal calls for a transfer of responsibility 
for all but the most seriously delinquent youth from the state to local 
governments. The governor’s proposal acknowledges the high cost and 
rehabilitative ineffectiveness of state confinement and seeks to relocate 
youth offenders from remote facilities into city-run facilities that are closer to 
their homes (Kaplan 2012). The transition from state to local juvenile justice 
will enable youth to receive rehabilitation, support, and opportunities while 
remaining close to their families. 
55 CONCLUSION  | 
Although one would expect the crime rate to drive incarceration rates, 
there often is no relationship. Sometimes, the prevalence of incarceration 
correlates with the crime rate, other times, the two deviate completely. As 
we have seen in the examples above, incarceration is the result of policy 
choices. Policymakers allocate a certain amount of funding for juvenile 
justice services and decide how to distribute these funds among secure 
facilities and alternatives to incarceration. When suitable alternatives exist, 
juvenile courts are likely to utilize them for youth who might be responsive to 
community-based supervision and/or treatment. For jurisdictions that have 
no dispositional options other than confinement and probation, confinement 
rates are likely to be inflated. 
Many states are exploring policies for reducing youth confinement. 
Confinement is a simple solution for handling troubled youth, but its 
consequences are complex. Secure facilities are often hundreds of miles 
away from the homes and families of delinquent youth, and they may receive 
minimal rehabilitation, if any, while confined. Community-based dispositions 
are often more effective (or at least no worse) than confinement, because 
courts and program coordinators can tailor dispositions to the individual 
needs of youth. For policymakers facing budget cuts and the need to reduce 
expenditures, community-based dispositions are often more cost-efficient 
than confinement. 
This report describes reforms being used across the country to reduce state 
dependence on confinement. Some states have pursued strategies classified 
as resolution; others have pursued reinvestment or realignment — and some, 
like California and New York, have tried more than one of these strategies, 
sometimes by blending them (Butts and Evans 2011). All of the strategies, 
however, share a common goal: localizing juvenile justice management and 
eliminating the incentives that often lead to over-incarceration. 
The important question for policymakers is: what happens to these reforms 
when crime rates increase, state budgets grow, or political change occurs? 
While resolution strategies may force state and county governments to seek 
alternative placements in the short-term, a state can simply build or expand 
facilities over time. Massachusetts shut down its residential youth facilities 
in 1972, but the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services currently 
operates 56 facilities, ranging from secure group homes to highly secure 
locked units (Sylva 2011). 
Similarly, states can (and do) scale back on incarceration by relying on 
reinvestment strategies that alter budget allocations, but these arrangements 
are reversible. Deschutes County, Oregon launched a reinvestment initiative 
to reduce its youth confinement and earn state funding for community-based 
alternatives. After the six-year pilot ended, the county discontinued the 
initiative. 
Realignment, by comparison, may be more durable, because it requires 
each county or region to build its own localized system. It is difficult to 
restore a centralized state agency that has been eliminated and replaced 
with smaller agencies managed at the local level. Realignment decentralizes 
state functions and enables communities to take control of decision-
making and policy implementation. Realignment strategies may be more 
resistant to policy changes and fluctuations in crime rates. The realignment 
approach, however, is relatively new. It may be too soon to assess its 
long-term effectiveness. But, to the extent that realignment results in a basic 
reorganization of management and responsibility for youth justice, it may be 
the best way for states to fund and oversee juvenile justice. 
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